Gender differences in moral development by Hoffman, Lois Wladis & Donenberg, Geri R.
Sex Roles, Vol. 18, Nos. 11/12, 1988 
Gender Differences in Moral Development 
Geri R. Donenberg and Lois W. Hoffman 
University of Michigan 
Sixty-nine Midwestern middle-class children and adolescents were tested on 
justice and care orientations when reasoning abstract and interpersonal moral 
dilemmas. Nona Lyons" ("Two Perspectives on Self, Relationships and Moral- 
ity," Harvard Educational Review, 1983, 53,125-145) scoring method was 
used to score subjects" responses. A 2(sex) × 2(age) analysis of  variance run 
on the total justice and care scores, as well as each individual dilemma, sup- 
ported Carol Gilligan's (In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and 
Women's Development, Cambridge, MA" Harvard University Press, 1982) 
theory that two distinct ways of  thinking about moral problems exist-justice 
and care-and are differentially related to gender. Girls emphasized the 
morality o f  care significantly more than justice. Contrary to Gilligan (1982) 
and Lyons (1983), however, boys in both age groups emphasized the morali- 
ty o f justice and care equally. Data from the interpersonal dilemmas using 
L yons's (1983) coding scheme are consistent with J. Piaget (The Moral Judge- 
ment of the Child, New York: Free Press, 1966) and Lawrence Kohlberg ['The 
Cognitive-Developmental Approach, " in D. A. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of 
Socialization Theory and Research, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969]: older 
subjects became more justice oriented and younger subjects emphasized the 
morality of  care. Sex differences on Kohlberg's stage theory were not sig- 
nificant and the protagonist's gender in the Heinz dilemma had no effect 
on moral reasoning. 
The study of moral development is currently expanding to include new ideas 
and considerations involving the process of moral development. In the past, 
Kohlberg's stage theory has been widely accepted as a conceptualization of 
an individual's moral growth. However, over the past decade many criticisms 
arose over the generalizability of his theory. Carol Gilligan (1977, 1982) sug- 
gested that people consider more than justice when reasoning moral conflicts, 
and found another "voice" concerned with care, relationships, and connec- 
tions with other people especially salient in women. A great deal of con- 
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troversy has arisen over the universality of Kohlberg's theory, as some research 
has shown distinct sex differences where females score lower than males on 
Kohlberg's stages. This research will examine the suggestions that the failure 
of women to fit existing models of growth and testing may indicate a problem 
with representative theories of human development, and that an additional 
strategy for reasoning moral dilemmas, the Morality of Care, is used by males 
and females in moral reasoning, but has been excluded from popular de- 
velopmental theories. 
Influenced by Piaget (1966), Lawrence Kohlberg (1969) created a univer- 
sal stage model to explain moral development. The scale was derived from 
extensive case analyses and two-hour interviews with boys ranging in age from 
10 to 16 years. Kohlberg presented them with hypothetical abstract moral 
dilemmas where obedience to law and rules or commands of authority con- 
flict with the needs or welfare of other persons (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969). 
The idea of justice reflected in Kohlberg's model closely resembles Piaget's 
theory that children move toward "autonomous morality." 
Kohlberg created a six-stage theory of moral development divided into 
three levels from the results of his study. In Stage 1, the child is egocentric 
and views everything as good and bad based on the individual's obedience 
to rules and authority. The second stage includes children whose behavior 
is motivated by self-satisfaction and occasionally satisfaction to others. These 
two stages comprise the Pre-conventional Level of morality. The next level 
of moral development according to Kohlberg, emphasizes conforming to so- 
cietal values and norms, which he labels the Conventional Level. In Stage 
3, children focus on gaining approval and pleasing others, while in Stage 
4 they are simply "doing their duty" and maintaining the social order for 
its own sake. The last level of development, Moral Principles, encompasses 
people who behave according to a universal principle of justice. Stage 5 is 
defined by laws and rules that determine right and wrong behavior, and where 
duty and obligation are in terms of contract not individual needs. The last 
stage in Kohlberg's scheme is comprised of people who resolve conflicts by 
applying a universal principle (Kohlberg, 1969). Progression through stages 
depends on resolving cognitive disequilibrium and is fostered by role-taking 
opportunities. According to Kohlberg, the model is culturally universal, the 
stage sequence is invariant and hierarchical, and each stage is homogeneous 
(Kohlberg & Kramer, 1968). The theory assumes that increased autonomy 
and individuation lead to more advanced moral thinking. There have been 
several revisions in the scoring system over the years, and in the recent revi- 
sion, Stage 6 has been eliminated (Colby, Gibbs, Kohlberg, Speicher-Dubin, 
& Candee, 1980). 
A great deal of the literature supports Kohlberg's theory (Holstein, 1976; 
Rest, 1983; Rest, Davison, & Robinson, 1978; Sternlieb & Youniss, 1975; 
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Turiel, 1966; Walker, 1984). However, many people have challenged its va- 
lidity (Bussey & Maugham, 1982; Fishkin, Keniston, & MacKinnon, 1973; 
Gilligan, 1977, 1982; Haan, 1975; Hoffman, 1984; Holstein, 1976; Rest, 1983; 
Simpson, 1974; Sullivan, 1977). 
James Rest (1983) reviewed a dozen cross-sectional and longitudinal 
studies that test Kohlberg's theory. While he found general support 
for the model, he discovered some important qualifications: there was 
no improvement over time, and no clear evidence that Stage 6 follows Stage 
5. Furthermore, he found inconclusive evidence that cognitive disequilibrium 
leads to moral growth and that the stage sequence is invariant. 
Holstein (1976) found supportive evidence for a stepwise sequence in 
moral judgment from level to level, but not stage to stage, and only for the 
first two levels. Regression in Kohlberg's stages has been found as well (Bus- 
sey & Maugham, 1982; Fishkin et al., 1973; Holstein, 1976; Kohlberg & 
Kramer, 1969). Another problem may be that people use different strategies 
for reasoning real-life or interpersonal as opposed to hypothetical dilemmas 
(Haan, 1975). 
Kohlberg's stage theory has been challenged as being sexually biased 
in favor of males (Baumrind, 1986; Bussey & Maugham, 1982; Gilligan, 1977, 
1982; Haan, Smith, & Block, 1968; Holstein, 1976; Kohlberg & Kramer, 
1969). Many people question the model's generalizability because it was der- 
ived from an all-male sample (Brabeck, 1983; Bussey & Maugham, 1982; 
Garwood, Levine, & Ewing, 1980; Gilligan, 1982) and also because the pro- 
tagonist in each dilemma is male, making it difficult for females to relate 
to. Furthermore, in many investigations girls have been found to score low- 
er than boys on Kohlberg's scale (Baumrind, 1986; Bussey & Maugham, 1982; 
Ford & Lowery, 1986; Gibbs, Arnold, & Burkhart, 1984; Haan et al., 1968; 
Holstein, 1976; Kohlberg & Kramer, 1968). Bussey and Maugham (1982) at- 
tribute this disparity to the nature of Stages 3 and 4, where Stage 3 has tradi- 
tionally "feminine" characteristics of expressiveness and need to do good to 
gain approval, and Stage 4 accommodates the typical "masculine" role of 
law and order. 
Other researchers have reported no sex bias on Kohlberg's scale (Bra- 
beck, 1983; Gibbs et al., 1984; Hoffman, 1975; Kerber, Greeno, Maccoby, 
Luria, & Stack, 1986; Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974; Rest, 1979, 1983; Thomas, 
1986; Walker, 1984), or that the females even scored higher than males (Gar- 
wood et al., 1980; Rest, 1979; Thomas, 1986). In a recent review of the liter- 
autre, Lawrence Walker (1984) found 10 studies of adolescents and youths 
out of 108 that yielded significant sex differences. Of these, 8 showed differ- 
ences favoring males. Walker attributes other sex difference findings to poor 
methodology and reliance on early stage theory definitions, and cites only 
a few consistent sex differences among children on Kohlberg's scale. 
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Thomas (1986) found girls were at no disadvantage when measured by 
Rest's (1979) Defining Issues Test, a measure of moral reasoning including 
six hypothetical dilemmas that involve competing social claims modeled af- 
ter Kohlberg's dilemmas. However, Bussey and Maugham (1982) varied the 
sex of the protagonist in a series of dilemmas using Kohlberg's measure, and 
discovered that males were affected and females were not. Males dropped 
to Stage 3 reasoning with a female protagonist but maintained Stage 4 thinking 
with a male protagonist. Females, however, remained at Stage 3 reasoning 
regardless the protagonist's gender. 
Thus sex differences on Kohlberg's measure have revealed ambiguous 
results. In addition, other concepts of morality have shown a very different 
pattern of sex differences, but these are also controversial. Empathy, guilt, 
altruism, and other helping behaviors also have been used to measure moral- 
ity. Much of this research indicates sex differences favoring females (Bra- 
beck, 1983; Eisenberg-Berg & Mussen, 1978; Hoffman, 1984). This body of 
research seems to support Gilligan, as prosocial behaviors seem to reflect 
caring considerations. 
However, some researchers claim there are no sex differences in proso- 
cial behaviors, and attribute the apparent evidence to poor methodology 
(Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983; Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974; Tavris & Offir, 1977). 
Tavris and Offir (1977) argue that girls have a reputation for being more 
altruistic, although in fact the sex differences are really quite small. Eisen- 
berg and Lennon (1983) claim that most sex-disparity empathy findings oc- 
cur on self-report standards of affective responses to others, and are not 
reliable. 
The present investigation was derived mainly from Gilligan's (1982) work 
on understanding women's development as different from men's, and empha- 
sizes the distinction between two moral voices, the Morality of Care and the 
Morality of Justice. GiUigan asserts that females develop differently than 
males, and as long as the categories by which development is assessed are 
derived from research on men, divergence from the masculine standard will 
inevitably be seen as a failure of development. Gilligan offers a new theory 
of development to account for women's experience, and identifies a distinct 
moral language among women that emphasizes the obligation to exercise care 
and avoid hurting others. Expanding on designs traditionally used to research 
moral development, Gilligan includes space for the differentiated, compre- 
hensive, and reflective thought patterns of women. She found that women 
define themselves through others and their relationships, while men tend to 
separate themselves from the world, making it easier for them to relate to 
the hypothetical abstract dilemmas currently employed to assess moral de- 
velopment. For men, the moral imperative is to respect rights and protect 
the rights to life and self-fulfillment. Women, however, are more concerned 
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with the welfare of other people. Gilligan describes the stages of women's 
development to represent a more complete understanding of the relation- 
ship between self and other, where each transition involves a critical rein- 
terpretation of the conflict between selfishness and responsibility. 
People have criticized Gilligan's (1982) theory on various levels. Kerb- 
er et al. (1986) suggest that Gilligan's model contains an inherent assump- 
tion that women feel and men reason, which has traditionally kept women 
out of more "serious" roles in society. They also argue that Gilligan's method 
of analysis was too interpretative and not empirical enough. 
Brabeck (1983) compares Gilligan's and Kohlberg's theories of moral 
development on their central points. For Gilligan, morality arises from con- 
flicting responsibilities for women, rather than competing rights as it does 
for men. Hurt is women's central moral concern, superseding issues of fair- 
ness. Furthermore, Brabeck suggests that Gilligan's theory explains a morality 
of responsibility based on nonviolence and harmony, whereas Kohlberg's is 
based on fairness and reciprocity. While Gilligan distinguishes issues of at- 
tachments, self-sacrifice and selfishness, and considerations of relationships, 
Kohlberg is more concerned with separateness, rules, legalities, and consider- 
ations of the individual. For women, Brabeck continues, moral dilemmas 
are contextual and resolved through inductive thinking, but in Kohlberg's 
scheme moral principles are universal and applied to moral dilemmas through 
formal and abstract thinking. In sum, Kohlberg assumes people develop 
through stages that are universal, invariantly sequential, and hierarchically 
arranged, while Gilligan's stage theory is hierarchically arranged but not in- 
variantly sequential and reflects women's growth. Brabeck concludes that 
both theories are essential and valuable in gaining an understanding of peo- 
ple's moral growth process. 
Recent empirical work on sex differences in moral development has been 
done by Nona Lyons (1983). She interviewed male and female children, 
adolescents, and adults, and found supporting data for two distinct kinds 
of considerations used by people when making moral decisions-justice and 
care. In response to many criticisms of the lack of empirical evidence for 
Gilligan's (1982) model, Lyons created a methodology for testing and cod- 
ing the data. Lyons more clearly defines the two moral voices used by men 
and women. According to Gilligan and Lyons, there are two ways of per- 
ceiving others and relating to others: (a) The perspective of the separate/objec- 
tive self, which Lyons has labeled "reciprocity," is based on impartiality, objec- 
tivity, and the distancing of the self from others. (b) The perspective of the con- 
nected self, which Lyons calls "response," is based on interdependence and 
concern for another's well-being. According to Lyons (1983), the Morality of 
Justice emphasizes the rules and laws in society and reasons moral conflicts ac- 
cording to a set conception of"right and wrong." The Morality of Care, however, 
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focuses on the people involved, their feelings, and the respondent's relation- 
ship/responsibility to their well-being. Lyons (1983) and Gilligan (1982) found 
these two voices differentially related to gender but not exclusive to one sex. 
To examine some of  these issues, an empirical investigation was un- 
dertaken in which children and adolescents in a middle-sized Midwestern col- 
lege community were interviewed to see how they solved abstract and 
interpersonal moral dilemmas. This study sought to answer the following 
questions: (a) Do girls emphasize the morality of  care while boys emphasize 
the morality of  justice, as suggested by Gilligan? (b) Are there age-related 
changes, as implied by Kohlberg, such that older subjects are more likely 
to emphasize justice while younger subjects are more likely to emphasize care? 
(c) Does the gender of  the protagonist in the story affect moral reasoning 
for boys or girls? 
M E T H O D  
Subjects 
Seventy-one Midwestern middle-class boys and girls from a college com- 
munity participated in the study. Names of  potential subjects were obtained 
through an elementary and a secondary school in the same district. Subjects 
selected were Caucasian and middle-class. One hundred and sixty letters were 
sent to potential subjects followed by a phone call to their homes. Of those 
contacted, thirty-eight 5th and 6th graders and thirty-three 10th and 1 lth 
graders agreed to participate. Six subjects were dropped from the study due 
to tape recording failures. Two 10th-grade interviews and four 5th-grade in- 
terviews ~ were inaudiable and could not be coded. 
Design and Procedure 
All data were obtained in individual interviews lasting from 15 to 20 
minutes. These interviews were conducted either in a classroom or the school 
library during free time or after school. A tape recorder was used to (a) 
preserve the interview, (b) allow coding to be done at a later date, and (c) 
allow for smooth uninterrupted interviews. Subjects were assured that no 
right or wrong answer existed, and they were not expected to answer in any 
particular fashion; they were encouraged to answer whatever questions they 
could, and to refuse any they did not want to answer. A series of  four moral 
dilemmas were read to each subject and s/he was asked to solve them. Fol- 
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lowing the procedure used by Lyons (1983), the experimenter asked probing 
questions in order to examine the subject's reasoning process, i.e., "Why do 
you choose to do that?" or "What would Kathy think about in trying to make 
that decision?" The probing questions following the dilemmas were divided 
into two categories of thought: how the subject constructed the problem and 
how s/he resolved the problem. 
Measures 
The first dilemma presented in the interview was Kohlberg's (1969) Heinz 
dilemma [see Table I(a)]. The experimenters could not apply Lyons's (1983) scor- 
ing method to this dilemma because of its abstract content. Thus, the Heinz 
dilemma was mainly used to assess sex and age differences on Kohlberg's 
stage theory of moral development, and to see if the sex of the protagonist 
affected the level of the response. Two versions of the Heinz dilemma were 
employed randomly to subjects in order to test for any effects of the pro- 
tagonist's gender on the subject's moral reasoning. One version of the story 
read that a man's wife was dying and in need of a drug, while the other ver- 
sion read that a woman's husband needed the drug to live. 
Second, an interpersonal moral dilemma created by Selman (1971) was 
employed [see Table I(b)]. Selman's adapted version of this interpersonal 
dilemma was used to accommodate the adolescent subject group. The con- 
flict in the story remains basically unchanged [see Table I(c)]. Questions in- 
volving conflict resolution between the two actors in the story were asked 
following the discussion of the Selman dilemma. 
Next, the subject was asked to describe a situation where s/he was not 
sure what to do. This is considered a real-life or personal dilemma provided 
by the subject in this study. While most subjects related a problem involving 
other people, if they did not they were encouraged to think of one involving 
others [see Table I(d)]. The research asked the same questions following the 
personal dilemma-i.e. ,  "What did you think about in trying to decide what 
to d o ? " - t h a t  were asked for the other interpersonal dilemmas. The subject 
was also asked to evaluate his/her decision in the real-life dilemma. 
The last dilemma presented in the interview was another hypothetical 
interpersonal situation created for this study and intended to be a common 
experience for all of the subjects [see Table I(e)]. The same follow-up ques- 
tions were asked to assess the subject's reasoning process. Finally, some gener- 
al questions about responsibility, caring, and morality were asked at the end 
of the interview, so that subjects' reasoning of the stories would not be af- 
fected by them. 
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Table 1. Moral Dilemmas 
(a) Heinz dilemma 
A man 's /woman 's  wife/husband is almost certain to die without a certain drug. 
The druggist who invented the drug won't  sell it to the husband/wife  except at a very 
high price, more than the husband/wife  can possibly pay. He will not  consider the 
possibility of  receiving part of  the money later. Should the husband/wife  steal the 
drug to save his /her  wi fe ' s /husband ' s  life? Why? 
(b) Selman friendship di lemma (children's version): 
Kathy and Becky have been best friends since they were five years old. They 
went to the same kindergarten and have been in the same class ever since. Every Satur- 
day they would try to do something special together, go to the park or the store, 
or play something special at home.  They always had a good time with each other. 
One day a new girl, Jeanette, moved into their neighborbood and soon introduced 
herself to Kathy and Becky. Right away Jeanette and Kathy seemed to hit it off very 
well. They talked about  where Jeannette was from and the things she could be doing 
in her new town. Becky, on the other hand,  didn't  seem to like Jeanette very well. 
She thought Jeanette was a showoff, but was also jealous of all the attention Kathy was 
giving Jeanette. 
When  Jeanette left the other two alone, Becky told Kathy how she felt about 
Jeanette. "What  did you think of  her Kathy? I thought  she was kind of pushy,  but- 
ting in on us like that ."  
"Come on Becky. She's new in town and just  trying to make friends. The least 
we could do is be nice to her." 
"Yeah, but  that  doesn't  mean we have to be friends with her," replied Becky. 
"Anyway, what would you like to do this Saturday? You know those old puppets 
of  mine, I thought  we could fix them up and make our own puppet show." 
"Sure, Becky, that  sounds great," said Kathy. "I'11 be over after lunch. I bet- 
ter go home now. See you tomorrow."  
Later that evening Jeanette called Kathy and surprised her with an invitation 
to the circus, the last show before it left town. The only problem was that Kathy 
had already promised to go to Becky's. Kathy didn't know what to do, go to the cir- 
cus and leave her best friend alone, or stick with her best friend and miss a good time. 
(c) Selman friendship di lemma (adolescent version): 
Charlene and Joanne have been good friends since they were five. Now they 
were in high school and  Joanne was trying out  for the school play. As usual she was 
nervous about  how she had done, but  Charlene was there to tell her she was very 
good and give her moral support .  Still Joanne was worried that a newcomer in the 
school would get the part. The new girl, Tina, came over to congratulate Joanne on 
her performance and then asked if she could join the girls for a snack. Right away 
Charlene and Tina seemed to hit it off  very well. They talked about  where Tina was 
from and the kinds of  things she could do in her new school. Joanne,  on the other 
hand,  didn't  seem to like Tina very well. She thought  Tina was a little pushy,  and 
maybe she was a bit jealous over all the attention Charlene was giving Tina. 
When Tina left the other two alone, Joanne and Charlene arranged to get 
together on Saturday, because Joanne had a problem that she would like to talk over 
with Charlene. But later that  day, Tina called Charlene and asked her to go see a 
play on Saturday. 
Charlene had a di lemma. She would have jumped at the chance to go with 
Tina, but  she had already promised to see Joanne.  Joanne might have understood 
and been happy that  Charlene had the chance to go, or she might feel like she was 
losing her best friend when she really needed her. 
(d) The personal dilemma: 
Have you ever been in a situation when you weren't really sure what to do? 
Can you describe it to me? 
(e) The third dilemma: 
Suppose two of your closest friends got into an argument  and both were try- 
ing to convince you that their side was right. Both friends said they would be angry 
with you if you didn't  join their side. 
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Scoring Moral Dilemmas 
Two different scoring methods were used to assess (a) the Kohlberg 
dilemma and (b) the interpersonal dilemmas. The first method was Kohl- 
berg's (1969) original system to determine subjects' stage score on the Heinz 
dilemma. The second method employed to score subjects' responses was quan- 
titative increments developed by Lyons (1983) to allow for a parametric 
statistical analysis of  the results. This scoring method was used to code sub- 
jects' reasoning of  the three interpersonal d i lemmas-Selman 's ,  the real- 
life/personal (provided by the subject), and the third (created for this study). 
Lyons's coding scheme divides people's moral reasoning into three 
categories: the construction, resolution, and evaluation of the problem. Sub- 
jects' responses were coded according to these distinctions and also deter- 
mined to be either a caring or justice consideration as defined by Lyons's 
model. Lyons's scheme details what constitutes justice or rights concerns, 
as well as response or care considerations. Following this method, subjects 
were given a point in the appropriate response or rights category according 
to their construction, resolution, or evaluation of  the dilemma. In other 
words, for each statement given by the subject, the coders assigned a 
ca t ego ry -  construction, resolution, or evaluation of  the p r o b l e m -  and then 
determined whether it was a caring or justice consideration. This method 
was applied to the Selman, real-life/personal, and third dilemmas. Finally, 
the number of  caring responses and justice responses were totaled for each 
part of  the problem (construction, resolution, and evaluation), as well as the 
total number of  justice and care responses overall for each subject. The sub- 
ject's dominant mode of  thought was determined by the category, justice or 
caring, with the higher score. 
Conflict Resolution 
The series of conflict resolution questions that followed the Selman 
dilemma were scored on a 4-point scale according to a prepared set of  possi- 
ble answers (i.e., yes/depends, no, other). Another attempt to assess the 
degree to which subjects were oriented toward care or justice was a question 
about whether a right and /o r  kind thing to do exists in situations of moral 
conflict, and which is more important for society, a hospital or a police 
department. 
General Questions 
The general questions were coded based on two possibili t ies- internal 
vs. external motivation and self vs. others. When subjects defined responsi- 
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bility and caring as self-motivated (e.g., " I f  I promise to babysit my little 
brother,  I am responsible to do that") rather than externally imposed (e.g., 
" I f  my room tells me to clean my room, I am responsible for my room being 
clean"), then they were given an internal score rather than an external one. 
Additionally, when subjects told of  a personal moral  di lemma that present- 
ed a conflict between self and others, and chose others when responsibility 
to both was equally important ,  they were given an "other" score. 
Coding 
All of  the interviews were coded by the senior author and one other 
person to reduce researcher bias. The other coder was trained to use Lyons's 
(1983) coding scheme, and was blind to the subject's gender and age while 
coding the interviews. The reliability between coders was .88. The general 
procedure was for both coders to listen to each interview together and as- 
sign a separate code. Any discrepancies were resolved in discussion and then 
assigned a code based on a joint decision. A new code was assigned with 
each new statement the subject made, but codes were not given twice when 
the subject merely repeated a previous statement in an at tempt to explain 
the same thought. 
RESULTS 
A 2(sex) × 2(age) x 2(version) analysis of  variance (ANOVA) was run 
on the Kohlberg stage score for the Heinz dilemma. The data indicate no 
significant effects due to age, sex, or the version of the story, and there was 
no interaction between any of the variables. Sex and sex by age effects were 
not significant. Although the differences were not significant, the total mean 
scores indicate that the older girls scored higher (M = 4) than all of  the other 
groups on the version with a male protagonist.  Younger boys reached the 
next highest stage for the same version (M = 3.4). Finally, the older girls 
also reached the highest stage for the version with a female protagonist  (M 
= 3.8) compared with the older boys (M = 3.5) and younger boys (M = 
3.7). The mean stage score for both sexes and ages was 3.5 (Table II). 
A second ANOVA was run 2 (sex) x 2 (age) with repeated measures, 
using the three dilemma stories to examine the effects of  sex and age on moral 
voice. Statistically significant sex differences were found on the number of  
care vs. justice responses given by male and female subjects. Girls gave sig- 
nificantly more care-oriented responses than boys [F(1, 62) = 23.19, p < 
.001] and a greater number  of  responses overall than the boys [F(1, 62) = 
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Table II. Kohlberg Stage by Sex, Age, and Version of Story 
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lOth- and l l th-  5th- and 6th- lOth- and l l th-  5th- and 6th- 
grade boys grade boys grade girls grade girls 
Version 1 3.25 3.42 4.00 3.10 
Version 2 3.50 3.75 3.77 3.50 
3.97, p < . 10]. While older subjects gave more responses than younger sub- 
jects [F(1, 62) = 10.01, p < .01], more care than justice responses were given 
overall [F(1, 62) = 26.16, p < .001], but the excess o f  care over justice 
responses was most  marked for girls (see Table III). 
Scores were further broken down into two parts: the construction and 
resolution o f  the interpersonal dilemmas. A third A N O V A  with repeated 
measures was run with 2 (sex) × 2 (age) and construction and resolution 
as the within-subject variables. As expected, there were statistically signifi- 
cant sex and age differences, paralleling the previous results. Based on the 
percentage o f  justice responses, cell means indicate that children were more 
oriented toward care for the construction o f  the di lemma and more justice 
oriented for the resolution o f  the conflict (M = .29 for construction and 
M = .41 for the resolution; see Table IV). The data analysis revealed that 
boys were more justice oriented than girls [F(I, 56) = 6.36, p < .05], and 
older children emphasized the Morality o f  Justice more often than younger 
children [F(1, 56) = 4.49, p < .05]. Statistically significant evidence also 
indicated that both boys and girls use care considerations over justice for 
the construction o f  the di lemma more than they do for the resolution o f  the 
Table I!I. 
Number of care and justice responses by sex and age 
10th- and l l th-  5th- and 6th- 10th- and l l th-  5th- and 6th- 
grade boys grade boys grade girls grade girls 
Care 7.61 6.05 11.50 ~ 10.41 '~ 
Justice 7.94 5.35 5.71 3.82 
NOVA for voice (no. of  responses) by sex and age 
Significance 
Source F ratio level 
Sex (S) 3.97 p < .10 
Age (A) 10.01 p < .01 
Voice (V) 26.16 p < .001 
VS 23.19 p < .001 
aSignificant at p < .10. 
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problem [F(1, 56) = 9.13, p < .01]. There were no significant sex and age 
interaction effects (Table IV). 
The separate analyses of each dilemma yielded findings consistent with 
the general results. In each dilemma, girls used the Morality of Care more 
often than Justice, and more often than boys: S e l m a n - F ( 1 ,  62) = 13.71, 
p < .001; P e r s o n a l - F ( 1 ,  62) = 13.20, p < .001; T h i r d - F ( 1 ,  63) = 3.59, 
p < .10. On the Selman and Personal dilemmas, we found older subjects 
gave more responses than younger subjects: S e l m a n - F ( 1 ,  62) = 4.22, p < 
• 10; Personal--F(1,  62) = 14.76, p < .001. In addition, complementing the 
general results, we found that on the Third and Selman dilemmas all sub- 
jects emphasized the Morality of  Care over Justice: S e l m a n - F ( 1 ,  62) = 
33.84, p < .001; T h i r d - F ( 1 ,  63) = 5.78, p < .05. Girls gave more responses 
than boys on the Selman dilemma [F(1, 62) = 9.39, p < .01] and older sub- 
jects showed a greater justice orientation on the Third dilemma than youn- 
ger subjects [F(1, 63) = 9.91, p < .01]. (See Tables V-VII.) 
No significant effects were found by age or sex on the conflict resolu- 
tion or general questions. The data on the general questions paralleled the 
overall results of  care and justice orientations. Subjects were generally more 
caring than justice oriented, and almost everyone believed a hospital was more 
important for society than the police department• 
DISCUSSION 
The data support in part and contradict in part the hypotheses of Kohl- 
berg and Gilligan. There were no significant sex differences on Kohlberg's 
Table IV. 
Percentage of justice responses in the construction and resolution of the dilemmas by sex and age 
10th- and l l t h -  5th- and 6th- 10th- and l l t h -  5th- and 6th- 
grade boys grade boys grade girls grade girls Marginal 
Construct ion 0.38426 0.24305 0.33074 0.18437 0.29022 a 
Resolution 0.54186 0.47660 0.34812 0.27154 0.41152 ~ 
NOVA for voice in construction and resolution by sex and age 
Significance 
Source F ratio level 
Sex 6.36 p < .05 
Age 4.49 p < .05 
Task b 9.13 p < .01 
~p < .01. 
b T a s k - t h e  construction or resolution of  the problem. 
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Cell means for the Selman dilemma by voice, sex, and age 
10th- and llth- 5th- and 6th- 10th- and llth- 5th- and 6th- 
grade boys grade boys grade girls grade girls 
Care 3.44 2.94 6.14 5.12 
Justice 2.61 2.12 2.21 1.59 
NOVA for Selman dilemma-voice-(no, of responses) by sex and age 
Significance 
Source F ratio level 
Sex (S) 9.39 p < .01 
Age (A) 4.22 p < .10 
Voice (V) 33.84 p < .001 
VS 13.71 p < .001 
scale as app l i ed  to  the single s tory.  This  resul t  agrees with some o f  the l i tera-  
ture  (Brabeck,  1983; Gibbs  et al . ,  1984; H o f f m a n ,  1975; Kerber  et al . ,  1986; 
M a c c o b y  & Jackl in ,  1974; Rest ,  1979, 1983; Thoma s ,  1986; Walke r ,  1984), 
bu t  con t rad ic t s  o ther  repor t s  (Baumr ind ,  1986; Bussey & M a u g h a m ,  1982; 
Gil l igan,  1977, 1982; H a a n  et al . ,  1968; Hols te in ,  1976; Kohlberg  & Kramer ,  
1968). Peop le  have cr i t ic ized research  tha t  suppor t s  sex di f ferences  on  Kohl-  
berg 's  s tage theo ry  as wrough t  with m e t h o d o l o g i c a l  diff icul t ies .  B a u m r i n d  
(1986), for  example ,  cites evidence tha t  a d ispar i ty  between the sexes on  Kohl-  
berg 's  scale can  be f o u n d  when educa t iona l  level, cul ture ,  and  class are  not  
cont ro l led ,  and  these var iables  were cons idered  here in the choice o f  our  sub- 
jects .  This  m a y  expla in  why we f o u n d  no sex dif ferences .  I t  is also poss ible  
tha t  the  fa i lure  to  f ind  sex d i f ferences  reflects  the  fact  tha t  sex d i f ferences  
when found  occur  mainly  in the last three stages, whereas means in this sample 
are  be tween three  and  four .  
Table VI. 
Cell means for the personal dilemma by voice, sex, and age 
10th- and 11th- 5th- and 6th- 10th- and llth- 5th- and 6th- 
grade boys grade boys grade girls grade girls 
Care 2.17 1.00 3.71 2.06 
Justice 3.00 1.76 1.79 1.41 
NOVA for personal dilemma-voice--(no, of responses) by sex and age 
Significance 
Source F ratio level 
Age 14.76 p < .001 
Voice x Sex 13.20 p < .001 
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Table VII. 
Cell means for the third dilemma by voice, sex, and age 
10th- and l l th- 5th- and 6th- 10th- and l l th- 5th- and 6th- 
grade boys grade boys grade girls grade girls 
Care 2.00 2.00 1.64 3.24 
Justice 2.33 1.39 1.71 0.82 
NOVA for third d i lemma-voice-(no,  of responses) by sex and age 
Significance 
Source F ratio level 
Voice (V) 5.78 p < .05 
VS 3.59 p < .10 
VA 9.91 p < .01 
Furthermore, our results did not show that scores are affected by the 
sex of the protagonist. The tendency for girls to reach a higher stage score 
when the protagonist was male may indicate a high ability to role play, and 
it is feasible that when girls are reasoning from a male perspective, they would 
role play from a more "masculine" point of view-thus,  Stage 4. This was 
found among Bussey and Maugham's (1982) subjects; however, the girls in 
their study remained the same and boys vacillated depending on the pro- 
tagonist's gender. 
Contrary to Kohlberg, this study also failed to find significant age differ- 
ences on the Kohlberg scale. This could, however, reflect the fact that only 
one of his dilemmas was included in the research. The data from the inter- 
personal dilemmas did indicate that older subjects were more justice orient- 
ed while younger subjects emphasized the morality of care. 
As suggested by Gilligan, the data reveal two distinct modes of moral 
thought, justice and care, and while males and females use both strategies 
in making moral choices, there is a propensity for the two voices to be 
differentially related to gender. These results support the research that sug- 
gests males and females emphasize different concerns when thinking about 
moral conflicts (Bussey & Maugham, 1982; Gilligan, 1982; Huston, 1983; 
Johnston, 1985; Lyons, 1983). It may seem surprising, however, that in 
neither age group did boys emphasize the Morality of Justice significantly 
more than Care. This could be because of the nature of the dilemmas chos- 
en here, which are more personal then abstract. However, it might also reflect 
the growing challenge to the male stereotype, where it has become easier for 
boys to be caring today than in the past. Hoffman (1977) has argued that 
both sexes are socialized into the "expressive" role, but upon entering adoles- 
cence, boys are subsequently pressured into the "masculine role" to succeed. 
Males, then, succumb to the pressure to achieve at the expense of being car- 
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ing. However, because the older male subjects here still young, it is possible 
that they have not yet been socialized into the masculine role in this sense, 
and may still maintain a caring approach to the moral dilemmas presented 
in this investigation. 
It is interesting that, while girls emphasized care on the interpersonal 
dilemmas more than boys, it was the older girls who obtained the highest 
mean score on the Kohlberg Heinz dilemma. It seems likely that the content 
of a story's dilemma affects an individual's approach to solving the problem. 
Thus, if the conflict involves societal rules and expectations including the 
law, i.e., the Heinz dilemma, it is appropriate for the individual to concern 
her/himself with social principles when resolving the dilemma, but if the 
problem deals only with interpersonal relationships, caring concerns would 
seem to have precedent over abstract rules. Flexibility in solving moral dilem- 
mas according to its particular content seems appropriate and even expect- 
ed. In this study, the adolescent girls tended to score higher on Kohlberg's 
justice measure when the problem involved issues of rights and responsibili- 
ties to the law, but used a caring approach when presented with conflicts 
between friends, suggesting perhaps that compared to boys and younger girls, 
they showed more content-based flexibility in reasoning about the dilemmas. 
The major findings of this study come from the interpersonal moral 
dilemmas scored according to the method developed by Lyons (1983). They 
support the hypothesis that there are two ways of thinking about moral is- 
sues, justice and care, and that these are related to both gender and age. But 
while girls emphasize the morality of care more than justice in responding 
to the interpersonal dilemmas, boys emphasize both equally. While both boys 
and girls show a shift toward justice responses with age, the older as well 
as the younger are clearly concerned with care as well as justice. Thus the 
data indicate that both boys and girls, in grade school and in high school, 
use both moral voices in reasoning moral conflicts. This result is also reported 
in a study of college students by Rothbart, Hanley, and Albert (1986). It 
is reasonable to assume that each of these moral orientations is valuable and 
that different situations may call for one more than the other. It may be, 
then, that future research should focus less on gender differences per se and 
investigate instead the process by which each moral voice, and the sensitivi- 
ty to appropriately differentiate them, develop in both boys and girls. 
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